School finance reforms caused some of the most dramatic increases in intergovernmental aid from states to local governments in U.S. history. We examine whether teachers' unions affected the fraction of reform-induced state aid that passed through to local spending and the allocation of these funds. Districts with strong teachers' unions increased spending nearly dollar-for-dollar with state aid, and spent the funds primarily on teacher compensation. Districts with weak unions used aid primarily for property tax relief, and spent remaining funds on hiring new teachers. The greater expenditure increases in strong union districts led to larger increases in student achievement.
I.

Introduction
The school finance reforms that occurred across the U.S. beginning in the early 1970's caused some of the largest transfers from states to local governments in U.S history. Recent work has linked these reforms to sustained improvements in student achievement, and long-run increases in educational attainment, earnings, and intergenerational mobility (Jackson, Johnson, & Persico, 2016; Hyman, 2017; Lafortune, Rothstein, & Schanzenbach, 2018; Candelaria & Shores, 2018; Biasi, 2017) . However, some of the earliest and most fundamental questions regarding school finance reforms were not about their effects on student outcomes. Rather, early studies focused on the effect of school finance reforms on the distribution of school spending across districts and whether local school districts responded to increases in state aid by reducing local taxing effort (Murray, Evans, & Schwab, 1998; Hoxby, 2001; Card & Payne, 2002) . These studies found a substantial incidence of "flypaper," with most of the increases in state aid translating into increased education spending.
The finding that state aid from school finance reforms tended to "stick where it hit" contributes to a larger literature on the flypaper effect, in which some studies find very little or no evidence of local effort crowd-out of intergovernmental aid (Dahlberg et al., 2008; Feiveson, 2015) , while others find substantial or near total crowd-out (Knight, 2002; Gordon, 2004; Lutz, 2010; Cascio, Gordon, & Reber, 2013) . One leading explanation for the flypaper effect is about local politics, and specifically, that special interest groups influence the allocation of resources by lobbying for intergovernmental grants to be spent on the preferred good (Inman, 2008; Singhal, 2008) . In education, teachers' unions are the most prominent special interest group, and an extensive literature examines their impact on the size of school district budgets, district resource allocations, and student outcomes (Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009; Frandsen, 2016; Lovenheim & Willen, 2018) . However, despite the long-standing interest in how teachers' unions and school finance reforms have affected school spending and student achievement, the question of whether and how teachers' unions influenced local responses to school finance reforms remains unexplored.
In this paper, we provide the first evidence on whether the strength of local teachers' unions influenced: 1) the extent to which school finance reform-induced increases in state aid translated into increased education spending by local districts, 2) the allocation of these expenditures across different inputs to education production, and 3) the effect of reforminduced increases in state aid on student achievement. We combine National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) school district data from 1986 through 2012 on revenue, expenditures, staffing, and teacher salaries with data on the timing of statewide school finance reforms and information on state teachers' union power. Our primary measure of teachers' union power is based on an index that incorporates administrative and survey data across several areas related to teachers' union strength. 1 We use the plausibly-exogenous timing of statewide school finance reforms as an instrument for state aid and examine whether the effects of reform-induced increases in state aid on total and local revenue, expenditures, and the allocation of resources differ by state teachers' union power. Finally, we assemble microdata from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) to examine whether any differential effects of the reforms on 1 We also use more traditional measures of state teachers' union power that rely solely on state public sector collective bargaining laws and right-to-work status. education spending by teachers' union power also translate into differential effects on student achievement.
We find that unions played a critical role in determining both the amount of state aid that translated into education expenditures and the allocation of these funds. Consistent with a basic model of teachers' union preferences, school districts in states with the strongest teachers' unions increased education expenditures nearly one-for-one with increases in state aid in response to school finance reforms, whereas states with the weakest unions reduced local tax effort by approximately 80 cents on the dollar. Districts in strong teachers' union states allocated more of the additional spending toward increasing teacher salaries, while districts in weak union states spent the money primarily on teacher hiring. Spending in non-instructional areas such as capital outlays, administration, and classroom support also increased more in strong teachers' union states than in states with weak teachers' unions. Finally, we find that the larger expenditure increases in strong teachers' union states translated into larger impacts on student achievement: ten years after a reform, students in low-income districts in weak teachers' union states scored 0.08 standard deviations (SDs) higher, but scored 0.16 SDs higher in strong teachers' union states.
While our methodology is similar to recent papers exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of school finance reforms across states (e.g., Jackson et al., 2016; Lafortune et al., 2018) , an additional threat to the validity of our analysis is the potential endogeneity of state teachers' union power. We show that our results are robust to two alternative identification strategies that address this potential threat: 1) a border discontinuity analysis where we restrict our sample to districts along state borders where there are differences in teachers' union power but not in observed population characteristics; and 2) directly controlling for heterogeneity in the effects of school finance reforms by key state-level predictors of union power, such as share voting for the Democratic presidential candidate, and median household income. The robustness of our results to these alternative strategies suggests that we are identifying the effects of teachers' unions, and not unobserved differences across states with strong versus weak teachers' unions. We also show that our results are robust to alternative ways of categorizing school finance reforms, including using a stacked difference-in-differences estimation strategy that includes all reforms for states that experienced multiple reforms.
Our results provide important insights to the school finance reform literature. Early studies found that a dollar of state aid increased district education spending by 50-65 cents (e.g., Card & Payne, 2002) , while more recent work shows achievement gains for low-income districts on the order of 0.1 SDs 10 years post-reform (Lafortune et al., 2018) . We find similar mean flypaper effects and achievement gains, but show that these mask dramatic heterogeneity driven by the strength of local teachers' unions. This heterogeneity is so stark that it is consequential for assessing the success of the school finance reform movement, suggesting that in the absence of teachers' unions, the reforms would have had little impact on school resources or student achievement, leading instead to large increases in property tax relief. These findings are consistent with Inman's (2008) argument that local politics is the primary explanation for the flypaper phenomenon, and specifically, that local unions or other special interest groups ensure intergovernmental grants "stick where they hit."
It is also possible that strong teachers' unions used their power to influence the design of school finance reforms in a way that would limit the degree of local crowd-out. As Hoxby (2001) notes, school finance reforms are quite heterogeneous in their design, with some states implementing reforms that level-up spending and others implementing reforms that level-down spending. While it is possible that our results are driven in part by the influence of teachers' unions on the specific design elements of reforms, we find little evidence that the type of reform implemented by states is correlated with state teachers' union power. 2 Finally, our results build on the labor economics literature examining the effects of teachers' unions (Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009; Frandsen, 2016; Lovenheim & Willen, 2018) . We find large and important impacts of unions on the size and allocation of school district budgets and on student outcomes. Perhaps most interestingly, we demonstrate that in the context of this historically important school finance reform movement, teachers' unions acted in a manner consistent with special interests, namely maximizing the welfare of their members. Yet, the outcome of this rent-seeking behavior aligned with the objectives of the school finance reform movement, ensuring that the reforms were effective in reducing inequality across school districts in education resources and student achievement.
II.
Teachers' Unions, School Spending, and the Allocation of Resources
The neoclassical view of intergovernmental grants suggests that when communities receive a lump sum grant from a higher-level government, they treat that grant the same as an equivalent increase in private income. Thus, intergovernmental grants should increase spending by the same amount as an equivalent increase in income. A large literature, however, has found 2 As detailed in the online appendix, we classify all the school finance reforms in our sample into six types, and show that the correlations between teachers' union power and reform type are quite low, and whether they are positive or negative does not consistently support the hypothesis that unions would favor reform types that discourage local crowd out. & Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008) . Among these alternative explanations, Inman (2008) suggests that the most likely explanation for the flypaper effect is politics. Specifically, several studies have developed models that focus on the role of special interest groups, such as unions, as an explanation for the flypaper effect (Dougan & Kenyon, 1988; Singhal, 2008; Seig & Wang 2013) . In these models, interest group lobbying leads to an allocation of resources that favors spending on the good preferred by the interest group.
In education, teachers' unions are the most prominent special interest group. Thus, the theoretical models discussed above predict that after an increase in intergovernmental aid brought about by a school finance reform (SFR) teachers' unions will lobby to direct intergovernmental aid toward school spending and away from property tax relief, leading to the flypaper effect (see Appendix Figure 1a ). Furthermore, regardless of whether teachers' unions are primarily rent-seeking or simply interested in maximizing school quality, they will use their political power to advocate for higher school spending. However, if unions are primarily rentseeking, then increasing the size of the budget allows them to bargain for higher teacher salaries or other items that disproportionally benefit teachers (see Appendix Figure Ib) . Similarly, if unions are primarily interested in maximizing school quality, and additional resources lead to higher student achievement, unions will again advocate for higher school spending.
III. Data
Our primary data source is the Local Education Agency (i.e., School District) Finance , we also utilize the annual NCES Common Core of Data (CCD) school district universe surveys that provide student enrollments and staff counts for every school district.
We restrict our sample in several ways. First, note that we aim to examine whether teachers' unions affect the degree to which inter-governmental aid "sticks where it hits," i.e., the flypaper effect. As discussed in Inman (2008), one of the explanations for why prior studies have found strong evidence of a flypaper effect is that researchers may have misclassified matching grants as lump sum grants. Furthermore, we acknowledge that SFRs vary in their design and intended impacts (Hoxby, 2001) . Thus, to avoid misclassifying matching grants as lump sum aid, and to focus as much as possible on similarly designed SFRs, we omit Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas since these states implemented "reward for local effort"
(matching grant) formulas as part of their SFRs. We also omit Michigan and Wyoming because these states adopted SFRs that eliminated local discretion over funding. Second, because the NCES F-33 financial data tends to be noisy, particularly for small districts, we follow Gordon Finally, in our preferred specifications, we omit the final three 3
Here and subsequently, we refer to a school year by its fall year, i.e., 2011 refers to 2011-12. 4 See the online appendix for a more detailed discussion of our data and sample restrictions.
years (2009) (2010) (2011) of our sample due to the severe and potentially confounding influence of the Great Recession on school finances during that time (Evans, Schwab, & Wagner, 2017) . We show in Appendix 8 We prefer the continuous index over the alternative measures, because it provides a much finer measure of teachers' union power with a unique value for each state, and thus more variation across states to exploit.
7
To avoid endogenous changes in union power, both of our alternative union power measures are based on the CB and RTW laws that were in place in 1987, the first year of our sample time frame. We note, however, that for our main analytic sample that spans the years 1987-2008, only one state adopted a Right-to-Work law (Oklahoma) and two states changed their collective bargaining laws (Alabama and New Mexico).
8
Appendix However, we show that the pattern of results that we find is similar regardless of which teachers' union power measure we employ.
IV. Empirical Framework
To examine the effect of SFR-induced intergovernmental grants on school district expenditures and resource allocations, and whether state teachers' union power led to heterogeneity, we estimate models of the following form: In our most parsimonious specification, includes 1986 district enrollment and 1980 district median income. We then add 1980 district fraction black, fraction urban, and fraction of adults 25 and older who have a Bachelor's degree. We exclude time-varying characteristics because they could be affected by the SFRs (i.e., endogenous controls). Therefore, we include each characteristic interacted with a linear time trend to allow for differential trending by districts with different baseline values of these characteristics. We additionally include 9 We report the results clustering at the state level in Panel C of Appendix Table 4 . 
and the second model is identical to equation (2), but where the dependent variable is * . In equation (2) Given that other factors could be changing over time across these district terciles, we include , the tercile dummies interacted with a linear time trend in equations (1)- (2), to allow for differential trending across these terciles.
10
Our results are robust to using a just-identified model that includes only the bottom tercile SFR effect and its interaction with union power as instruments (see Panel B of Appendix Table 4 ).
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A. Dynamic Event Study Specifications
To provide evidence that SFRs induce exogenous variation in state aid to school districts, we also estimate an event study model of the following form:
where, , represents a series of lead and lag indicator variables for when state s implemented a SFR, is a random disturbance term and all other terms are as defined as above. We recenter the year of adoption so that , always equals one in the year in which state s implemented a SFR. We include indicator variables for 2 to 6 or more years prior to implementation of a SFR ( , , ,
), the year of implementation, , , and 1 to 10 or more years after implementation ( , , ). Note that equals one in all years that are 6 or more years prior to the implementation of a SFR, and , equals one in all years that are 10 or more years after the implementation of a SFR. The omitted category is the year just prior to a state implementing a SFR, , .
The coefficients of primary interest in equation ( 
V. Results
00828 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
We begin our analysis by showing that SFRs led to exogenous increases in state aid.
Specifically, we estimate the event study model from equation (3) for the full sample of school districts and also separately for school districts in each within-state median income tercile. We then plot the estimated ′ and associated 95% confidence intervals. Figure IIa (all districts)
shows that after a SFR, state aid increases to between $500 and $1,000 per-pupil above the prereform level, and remains at this level through at least 10 years after the reform. Importantly, there is no evidence of trending state aid prior to SFRs. Figure Having established that the timing of SFRs appears to have been exogenous, we move to our two-stageleast-squares (2SLS) framework to estimate the effects of SFR-induced increases in state aid.
A. Effects of State Aid on Revenues and Expenditures
11
Appendix Figures III and IV present similar event study pictures, plotting state aid, total revenue, local revenue, and current expenditures at the 25th and 75th percentile of state union power. In no case do we find evidence of differential pre-trends by union power.
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We present estimates from the second stage of our Instrumental Variables (IV) analysis in Table 2. 12 Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A show the effects of a SFR-induced one dollar increase in state aid on school district total revenue. Before adding the expanded controls, the results reported in column 1 reveal that for a state with the mean value of union power (index=0), total revenue increases by 64 cents with every dollar increase in state aid, while a one SD increase in teachers' union power leads to a 32 cent larger increase in total revenue. This pattern of results is similar after adding the expanded controls -a 68 cent increase at the mean level of union power, and a 30 cent larger increase given a one SD increase in union power (column 2). These results demonstrate that while total revenue goes up by two thirds of a dollar for every dollar increase in state aid at the mean level of union power, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of crowd-out depending on the strength of a state's teachers' union.
As property tax relief is the likely source of crowd-out, we next examine the effects of increased state aid on local revenue (Table 2 , columns 3 and 4). Using our preferred specification with the additional controls, districts in a state with mean teachers' union power reduce local revenue by 29 cents for each additional dollar of state aid, with a 27 cent smaller reduction (i.e., only a two cent reduction) in states with teachers' union power one standard deviation higher and a 0.56 cent reduction (i.e., 29 + 27 cents) in local revenue among states with teachers' union power one standard deviation lower. These results explain most of the heterogeneity in total revenue increases by union power -districts in weak teachers ' union 12 First-stage results, presented in Appendix Table 3 , match closely with those seen in Figure II .
The first-stage F-statistic for the regression of state aid on the instruments is 23, and for the regression of state aid interacted with union power on the instruments is 36. In Figures IIIa-IIIc we plot the estimated coefficients reported in Table 2 at each vigintile (i.e., 20 percentiles) of the union power index. The teachers' union power distribution is skewed such that the top of the distribution is one standard deviation above the mean and the bottom of the distribution is two standard deviations below the mean. We report in the bottom two rows of Table 2 the coefficients and standard errors at the 25th and 75th percentile of union power. Figure IIIb) . Finally, the heterogeneity in total revenue across the union power distribution also translated into similar heterogeneity in educational expenditures ( Figure IIIc) . Taken together, the results reported in Table 2 and Figures IIIa-IIIc reveal that differences in state teachers' union power were highly influential in shaping the extent to which the state aid increases from SFRs translated into changes in total revenues and expenditures for education.
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B. Boosting Teacher Compensation or Shrinking Class Size
The aforementioned results suggest that teachers' unions played a powerful role in determining the pass-through rate of SFR-induced state aid increases to education expenditures.
However, unions may also shape the allocation of resources to different inputs. For example, unions may prefer to spend a larger share of any increase in state aid on teacher compensation than on teacher employment (see Appendix Figure 1b ). We next examine the effect of SFRinduced increases in state aid on class size and teacher salaries, and whether these effects differ by the power of a state's teachers' unions.
First, we examine effects on the pupil teacher ratio (PTR), which is our measure of class size. A one thousand dollar increase in state aid reduces the PTR by 0.84 pupils among districts in a state with the mean value of union power ( suggesting that unions alter the allocation of resources away from teacher hiring.
We next examine the effects of SFR-induced state aid increases on teacher compensation. Teacher salaries are typically a lock-step schedule based on level of experience and education. While district average teacher salaries are provided in the CCD, these conflate changes to the teacher salary schedule with changes in hiring of new teachers that are usually paid less than the average teacher in the district. Information on teacher salary schedules are not available in our primary CCD data so we use salary schedule information from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), which surveys a random cross-section of school districts every few years about staffing, salaries, and other school, district, teacher, and administrator information.
We focus on base teacher salary, which is available in every wave and is particularly informative about average teacher salaries given the high rate of teacher attrition and relatively large degree of compression in teacher wages. Unfortunately, given the limited number of years and overlap of districts across waves, we lose about 91 percent of our sample size.
15 15
Appendix Table 5 shows the number of district observations by state and year used in this analysis. In Panel D of Appendix Table 4 , we show that the results for revenues, expenditures, and class size are robust to restricting to the SASS sample of district-years.
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Consequently, we exclude the controls interacted with the linear time trend, given the limited number of years in the sample with which to estimate the trend.
We find that a one dollar increase in state aid leads to a statistically insignificant 32 cent increase in teacher salaries for districts in a state with mean teachers' union power, and a statistically significant 51 cent larger increase for districts in states with one SD higher teachers' union power. Consistent with our basic conceptual framework, stronger teachers' unions appear to focus the increases in education expenditures more on increasing teacher salaries than on hiring new teachers. Taken together, these findings suggest that teachers' unions affect not only the fraction of SFR-induced increases in state aid that pass through to spending, but also the allocation of the spending increases across inputs.
C. Alternative Measures of State Teachers' Union Power
While we prefer the continuous measure of state teachers' union power, we examine whether the results are robust to using our alternative measures of state teachers' union power that avoid any possible concerns about endogeneity or subjectivity of the continuous measure.
Our first measure is simply an indicator variable for whether a state mandates collective bargaining (CB). Thus, in Panel B of statistically imprecise in both panels B and C, the overall pattern of results using these alternative measures is similar to that found when using the continuous index, thus reducing potential concerns about the subjectivity or endogeneity of that index.
D. Possible Teachers' Union Endogeneity
One concern with the results presented thus far is that our measures of teachers' union power may be correlated with state-specific unobservables that also influence education spending and the allocation of education resources. For example, state teachers' union power may be correlated with unobserved state population characteristics, such as voter sentiment about the appropriate level and allocation of K-12 education spending. As a result, voters in states with strong teachers' unions might choose to spend more on education and allocate educational resources differently than states without strong teachers' unions regardless of the teachers' unions themselves. This concern is partially allayed by the inclusion of district fixed 20 00828 9
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effects, which control for any unobserved district-or state-level factors to the extent that they are time invariant. However, there may be unobserved time varying differences causing the heterogeneity we detect. We now present results from two strategies that attempt to address this potential endogeneity of state teachers' union power. We move forward using the continuous union power index and our preferred specification that includes the expanded set of controls.
Our first strategy is a border discontinuity design that focuses on districts in counties along state borders. The assumption (which we support empirically) is that while school districts along these borders differ in terms of their states' teachers' union power, they are otherwise similar along both observable and unobservable dimensions due to their geographic proximity. If our results are robust to this sample change, this would provide confidence that any differences in the effects of state aid in these two types of districts is driven by differences in union power and not unobserved factors.
We use two different state border samples. First, we restrict to counties where the county centroid is less than 50 miles from the nearest state border. This strategy includes some counties not adjacent to a state border in geographically small states, and excludes some counties adjacent to a border in large states with geographically large counties. We alternatively restrict to only counties adjacent to state borders.
16
To implement the border discontinuity analysis, we restrict the sample to school districts in the counties close to state borders and then re-estimate equations (1)- (2) 
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states and includes counties on both sides of the border. The inclusion of the border-by-year fixed effect ensures that we are making comparisons across states within a given border.
To provide evidence that the border discontinuity sample provides a sample of districts that are similar according to their observed characteristics, we conduct a series of balancing tests by estimating cross-sectional models of the form: (4) is , which represents the average difference in , by state union power among districts located close to the border. If focusing on the border discontinuity sample leads to a more homogenous set of districts, then should be statistically insignificant or at least substantially smaller in magnitude when compared to estimates obtained from equation (4) that are based on the main sample of school districts and exclude the border fixed effects.
We first present the results from estimating equation (4) on the main sample (Table 3, columns 1 and 2). We find that districts in states with stronger teachers' unions are more likely to vote democratic in presidential elections, be more densely populated, and have higher median household income, lower fraction below poverty, and higher educational attainment.
We now restrict our sample to districts in counties whose centroid is within 50 miles of a state border and re-estimate equation (4), including border fixed effects and thus comparing districts along the same state border (Table 3 , columns 3 and 4). The sample appears much better balanced: most of the point estimates shrink dramatically. In fact, the only coefficients that remain marginally statistically significant are the coefficient on population density, which 22 00828 9
shrinks to approximately half of its previous magnitude, and the coefficient on fraction nonwhite, which shrinks to approximately one third of its previous magnitude. The pattern is similar when we instead restrict the sample to districts in counties that are adjacent to a state border (columns 5 and 6). These balancing tests provide encouraging evidence that our border sub-samples and specifications significantly reduce observed and therefore, hopefully, unobserved differences across districts by state teachers' union power.
We present results from the border analysis in Table 4 . Panel A restricts to counties within 50 miles of a state border, while Panel B restricts to border counties. The pattern of results is nearly identical to that in our main analysis: districts in states with stronger teachers' unions reduce their local tax effort to a smaller extent than states with weak unions, translating into more of the state aid going toward education expenditures. Districts in states with stronger teachers' unions also spend less on reducing class size and more on increasing teacher salaries.
While the magnitude of the point estimates varies to some extent, and we again lose statistical precision for the salary results, the pattern is generally robust across both border samples.
One concern with the border analysis is that there are both state-level and district-level sources of union endogeneity, and the border analysis only addresses confounders at the district-level. This concern motivates our second strategy, which involves controlling directly for heterogeneity of the effects of state aid by observable state characteristics that are highly correlated with state teachers' union power and may also influence how districts choose to allocate reform-induced increases in state aid. Specifically, we augment equation (1) Finally, as shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 , there are other characteristics that are strongly correlated with union power. To account for those characteristics, we regressed our 17 Further, there are three additional instruments, namely, 1 * * , 2 * * , and 3 * * .
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Appendix Table 6 shows that the results are robust to simultaneously including two of these characteristics at a time, instrumenting for each separately.
00828 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology union power index on all seven of these state-level characteristics. We then predict union power and re-estimate equation (5) using that predicted union power index for . We once again find that our results are largely robust to the inclusion of this additional interaction term, the main exceptions being that the coefficients on the interaction of state aid and union power for expenditures and base teacher salary become somewhat attenuated and lose statistical significance. Some attenuation is not surprising given the strong correlations between this group of covariates and union power. However, the fact that our results are largely robust to the inclusion of state aid interacted with this index that captures all of the observed covariates highly correlated with union power is reassuring.
E. School Finance Reform Coding and Sample Restriction Robustness
In this section we explore the robustness of our results to decisions about the way we code SFRs and restrict the sample (results shown in Appendix Table 7 ). First, we implement a stacked difference-in-differences design where instead of choosing one reform from each state that experienced a reform, we include all identified reforms, creating separate panels for each.
This check implicitly tests robustness to the few differences between our coding of SFRs and those of Lafortune et al. (2018) , given that these differences reflect choices over which reform is the "primary" reform in states that experience multiple reforms. Second, we exclude the handful of reforms that are not court-ordered. Third, we include the years spanning the Great Recession (2009 Recession ( -2011 . Fourth, we include states that adopted matching aid formulas. Fifth, we drop all states that did not experience a SFR during our sample period.
Finally, recall that we drop Michigan and Wyoming because they adopted reforms which effectively eliminated local discretion over funding. However, a number of states also adopted reforms that imposed a limit on how much a district may spend on education. As noted To examine that possibility, we drop districts in the top tercile of 1980 household income from our sample. Our results are generally robust to all of these checks.
F. Effects by Expenditure Type
In this section we estimate effects separately by expenditure sub-categories. This accomplishes two goals. First, it provides us with an alternative approach to examining whether teachers' unions favor spending state aid increases on class size reductions (i.e., teacher hiring) or on increasing teacher compensation. Specifically, note that instructional expenditures are primarily composed of expenditures on teacher compensation. Furthermore, recall that in Table   2 , we find that reform-induced increases in state aid have similar effects on class size in both strong and weak union states. Thus, if we find that reform-induced increases in state aid have a larger effect on instructional expenditures in strong union states than weak union states, this would suggest that the strong union states must be spending more of the marginal dollar of increased instructional spending on raising teacher compensation.
The second reason we explore effects by expenditure subcategories is that while we focus our examination of the allocation of resources on teacher salary increases and class size reductions, other inputs to education production can be important as well. Thus, we examine how much of each dollar of SFR-induced state aid passes through to various subsets of expenditures, for example, current expenditures versus capital outlay, and among current expenditures, instructional versus non-instructional spending.
In Table 6 We also find heterogeneity by teachers' union strength in the effects of SFR-induced increases in state aid on non-instructional expenditures (column 4) and on capital outlays (column 5), though the interaction of state aid and union power is statistically insignificant for the latter. Districts in strong union states see a 34 cent increase in non-instructional spending and 19 cent increase in capital outlays for every dollar increase in state aid compared to only a 23 cent and 14 cent increase, respectively, in weak union states. Thus, while there are important differences in how teachers' union power affects instructional spending, there are also important differences across these other spending categories. This suggests teachers' unions prefer not only higher teacher salaries, but also increases in items that may improve working conditions, such as curricular and administrative support, and infrastructure improvements.
G. Effects on Student Achievement
To examine whether the differences in spending by teachers' union power translated into differences in student performance, we use restricted-access microdata from the National Unlike effects on expenditures, effects of the reforms on achievement are not expected to appear immediately. Consequently, we modify our main specification in two ways. First, we focus on the reduced form impact of the reforms instead of instrumenting for spending. Second, we allow the impact to evolve linearly during the post-reform period instead of including a single post indicator as we do in our first stage analyses. Specifically, we estimate the following specification: * ,
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP
where is the average score in district i, in tested subject j and grade g, in state s, and year t; equals zero for non-reform states and for reform states prior to the reform, and equals the number of years since the reform in reform states; is a vector of subject-bygrade fixed effects; is a random disturbance term; and all other terms are as defined in equation (1). As before, we cluster the standard errors at both the district and state-year level. Table 7 presents the reduced form effects of SFRs on achievement. Without including the union interaction, we find an overall impact of SFRs of 0.007 standard deviations (SDs) per year, or 0.07 SDs ten years after a reform. This impact is driven by increases of 0.009 SDs per year in districts in the bottom tercile of within state median income. These effects, however, mask important heterogeneity. When we include the union interaction for all districts, there is a 0.009 SD per year impact at the mean level of state teachers' union power, and a statistically 19 For more details about the NAEP microdata, see the online appendix, LRS (2018), and Jacob and Rothstein (2016). Our results are robust to aggregating the data to the state-by-district income quintile-by-subject-by-grade-by-year level as in LRS (2018) (see Appendix Table 8 ). In Appendix Figure VI , we show event-study pictures that, as in LRS (2018), show no pre-trend in achievement followed by a steady post-reform increase in test scores driven by the lowest income districts. As in Table 7 , a gap in test scores between weak and strong union states emerges after the SFRs, with the effects concentrated among the lowest income districts.
These findings suggest that the larger expenditure increases in strong teachers' union states in response to SFRs translated into larger student achievement gains.
While a thorough exploration of the mechanisms behind these achievement impacts is difficult in this context, we conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations to understand the extent to which effects are due to changes in class size versus spending on other inputs. We use the results from the Tennessee STAR class size experiment, which reduced class sizes by 33% and increased achievement by 0.22 SDs, as a benchmark to estimate the fraction of our achievement results that are due to class size reductions (Krueger, 1999) . We find that almost half of the 20 Appendix Table 9 shows that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of controls. These informal calculations suggest that the additional spending on inputs to education production other than class size reduction in strong-union states was an important mechanism behind the larger achievement gains. However, evidence from the literature on the impacts of inputs such as teacher salaries, capital spending, and current non-instructional spending is too mixed and inconclusive for us to confidently disentangle the relative importance of each. While we cannot completely identify all the mechanisms, the magnitudes of our estimates are consistent with the recent literature finding that money matters in education production.
VI. Conclusion
School finance reforms led to some of the largest intergovernmental transfers from states to local school districts in U.S. history. In spite of the importance of understanding how school finance reforms affected local spending decisions, and the strong theoretical connection between teachers' unions and resource allocation, the question of whether and how teachers' unions influenced local governments' allocation of additional state aid remains unexplored by previous work. In this paper, we examine the role of teachers' unions in determining the extent to which school finance reform-induced increases in state aid translated into increased education spending by local districts and the allocation of these expenditures.
Our results suggest unions played a critical role in determining both the amount of state aid that translated into education expenditures, as well as the allocation of these funds. School districts in states with the strongest teachers' unions increased education expenditures nearly 21 See online appendix for calculations.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology one-for-one with increases in state aid in response to school finance reforms, whereas states with the weakest teachers' unions substantially reduced local tax effort, with education expenditures increasing less than 25 cents on the dollar. Furthermore, the school spending in strong teachers' union states was allocated more toward increasing teacher salaries, while districts in weaker teachers' union states spent the money primarily on hiring new teachers. We find that achievement gains due to the reforms were significantly larger in strong teachers' union states than they were in weak teachers' union states.
Our results have several implications. First, our results support local politics as an important explanation for the flypaper effect, and specifically, the strength of local unions in ensuring that grants stick where they hit. Second, our finding that reform-induced increases in state aid led to significantly larger increases in educational expenditures in states with strong teachers' unions provides an important new perspective on the effectiveness of the SFR movement that began in the 1970's: the recent studies documenting the success of these reforms mask the critical insight that in the absence of teachers' unions, the reforms would have led to large increases in property tax relief with little change for schools or students.
That said, our results are subject to several caveats. First, it is possible that our results are driven in part by the influence of strong teachers' unions on the specific design elements of reforms. Strong teachers' unions may have used their influence to advocate for specific structures in the school finance reforms that would discourage local crowd-out or level-up school spending. While we find little evidence that that the type of reform implemented by states is correlated with state teachers' union power, it is nevertheless possible that strong unions influenced the design features of reforms in a way that affected both the amount of state aid that passed through to local expenditures and the allocation of those expenditures. Second, Finally, our results provide an important perspective on the impacts of teachers' unions.
In response to the large increases in state aid induced by SFRs, teachers' unions appear to have acted primarily in a manner consistent with the objective of maximizing the welfare of their members, namely by increasing the size of school district budgets and channeling increases in state aid toward teacher compensation. However, the outcome of this rent-seeking behavior aligned with the objectives of the SFR movement, ensuring that the reforms were effective in reducing inequality across school districts in education resources and student achievement. To examine this concern, we collected the year that every state authorized charter schools or inter-district choice (if ever). We then include indicators for these reforms along with their interactions with union power in our achievement specifications. The results are essentially identical to those reported in Table 7 (see Appendix Table 10 ). Notes: The sample is as in Table 1 . All results are from 2SLS/IV models where the endogenous variables of interest are state aid and its interaction with state teacher union power ("Union"). The instruments are an indicator for school finance reform adoption interacted with 1980 district median income terciles and those variables further interacted with "Union." Each column and panel presents results from a separate regression where the dependent variable is listed in the top row. All specifications include: 1) controls for baseline district enrollment and 1980 district median income interacted with a linear time trend as well as those two variables interacted with both a linear time trend and the union power measure, 2) an indicator for whether the stateyear is subject to a binding tax or expenditure limit, 3) district fixed effects, 4) census region-by-year fixed effects, and 5) 1980 district median income tercile dummies interacted with a linear time trend. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 add additional controls for 1980 district fraction of the population black, fraction urban, and fraction with a BA or higher, each interacted with a linear time trend, as well as those same variables interacted with both a linear time trend and the union power measure. Robust standard errors, clustered at both the district and state-year level, in parentheses. Number of Districts * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Each point estimate is from a separate district-level (cross-sectional) regression of the listed county or district characteristic on our continuous state teacher union power measure. Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample of districts used in Tables 1-2 . Columns 3 and 4 restrict to districts in counties whose centroid is less than 50 miles from a state border. Columns 5 and 6 restrict to counties adjacent to a state border. Columns 3-6 include state border fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state in columns 1-2, and by state-by-border in columns 3-6. Table 3 that are correlated with union status. Robust standard errors, clustered at both the district and state-year level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Notes: The sample is at the district-subject-grade-year level. Each column presents results from a separate regression of weighted mean NAEP scores on a linear post-reform trend (columns 1, 3, and 5), and the post-reform trend interacted with our measure of union power (columns 2, 4, and 6). All specifications include the controls and fixed effects listed in the Notes: Each figure shows point estimates (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) from 2SLS regressions of the dependent variable on state aid per-pupil and aid interacted with our continuous state teacher union power index. The figures show the calculated point estimate at percentiles of the union power measure. For example, Figure (a) shows that for every dollar increase in state aid due to school finance reforms in states with the weakest teacher unions, total revenue increases by about 10 cents. For states with the strongest teacher unions, it increased nearly 1-for-1.
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